The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Examiner’s report is out, and anyone interested in knowing more about the reasons behind the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history should at least take the time to read the Executive Summary.  Much of the initial press coverage has focused on Lehman’s use of “Repo 105” transactions to reduce reported net leverage,  for example, from 13.9 to 12.1 for the end of the second quarter of 2008.   An even bigger gap between reality and what was reported to the public is noted just a page or two later in the Examiner’s Report:  “By Sept 12 [2008], two days after [Lehman] publicly reported a $41 billion liquidity pool, the pool actually contained less than $2 billion of readily monetizable assets.”  By understating its leverage, and overstating its liquidity, Lehman Brothers misled the rating agencies, government officials and the investing public.  The Examiner’s report is shining a much needed spotlight on what happened, and why, and may result informer Lehman officers being held accountable for their roles.